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 IMPLEMENTING PERFORMING RIGHTS 2 
 Hector L MacQueen and Alan Peacock  
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this contribution is to move the study of performing rights forward and 
away from discussion of matters of principle to matters of implementation. Our procedure 
is to identify the chronological steps which have to be taken by composers or their 
representatives in ensuring that their property right can be exploited, resulting in 
payment for performances. At each step we shall attempt to offer observations, based 
principally but by no means solely on UK experience, on both the economic and legal 
issues that arise. The first stage in the exploitation of copyright is to create a work in a 
discernible form. In music this has traditionally taken the form of a score. However, today 
most popular music will take the form of a taped performance. This is followed by critical 
discussion of the term of copyright protection and whether a monopoly is created in 
respect of performing rights. In addition to performing rights, account has also to be taken 
of performers’ rights, raising issues of where copyright protection ends and performers’ 
rights begin. The second stage of exploitation is publication, promotion and performance 
of the work, a matter so complex that it has necessitated the establishment of collective 
organisation of authors and publishers to be effective. Policy issues arise about the 
relations between the members of such organisations inter se, and between the 
organisations and users, and these are illustrated by a number of examples from the 
history of the British Performing Right Society. Disputes led to the establishment of 
specialist tribunals in the UK and elsewhere, and there have also been investigations of 
collecting societies by the British and EC competition authorities. The global market for 
music means that such issues transcend national frontiers, and there is some discussion 
of how performing rights are enforced internationally. The paper concludes by identifying 
a number of major issues: whether or not collecting societies operate against the 
consumer interest (it is suggested, generally not); the extent to which ‘serious’ music is or 
should be subsidised by diversion of the income of the collecting societies in its support; 
and the possible extension of collective copyright administration into other fields, against 
the background of ever-increasing cross-border activity in cultural matters generally. 
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I Introduction 
The purpose of this contribution is to move the study of performing rights forward and 
away from discussion of matters of principle (e.g. should performing rights exist at all and 
how long should a property right in performance last?) to matters of implementation. This 
is not to say that matters of principle do not arise in describing and analysing the 
problems that arise when composers of music or theatrical works go to market armed 
with the legal protection of their copyright. In fact, it may be argued that experience in 
implementation has had a marked effect on views about the principles that should apply 
to the determination and exploitation of such rights. 
 Two important factors cast their shadow over our analysis. The first is the 
impressive growth in international trade in both ‘live’ and ‘canned’ performances of 
musical and theatrical works. The second is the rapid transfer of technology between 
countries which makes it possible to perform a work in one country, simultaneously 
record it, and copy the recording in another country. Both these factors require clear 
understandings about the rights of the persons and organizations involved in what may 
be highly complicated transactions; and these understandings must be capable of being 
clearly set out in legally enforceable contracts. Clearly, the transaction costs of all parties 
could be considerably reduced if the countries concerned have similar laws of copyright, a 
fact recognized in the current discussion of how performing rights should be regulated 
within the EC, as well as in the establishment in 1886 of the Berne Convention and, very 
recently, in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) which formed part of the GATT Agreement concluded in April 1994. 
 Our procedure is to identify the (chrono)logical steps which have to be taken by 
composers or their representatives in ensuring that their property right can be exploited, 
resulting in payment for performances. At each step we shall attempt to offer 
observations, based principally but by no means solely on UK experience, on both the 
economic and legal issues that arise. A final section singles out some of these issues for 
further discussion. 
 
II Establishing Copyright Protection 
The first stage in the exploitation of copyright is to create a work which meets the 
requirements of copyright - i.e. is an original, literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work - 
and to put it in a form in which it can be transmitted to its audience. In music this has 
traditionally taken the form of a score which is printed and distributed by a publisher. A 
score is a set of instructions to one or more instruments, including voice, which indicate 
how the composition is meant to sound. However, today most popular music will not 
appear in sheet form but will take the form of a taped performance. The development of 
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digital technology has created further complications here, inasmuch as the form in which 
the record has been made is so easily manipulated, not only by the composer but by others 
whether or not acting with his or her license, that it may be difficult to identify exactly 
what the protected work is, or indeed, where the manipulation has altered the essential 
character of the initial work, and who the author and protected person may be (Frith 
1993). 
 Giving the work a recorded form is important if rights are to be exploited, 
particularly nowadays when such rights extend to performances not only during the 
composer’s lifetime but for a period of 70 years after death, as will be the case throughout 
the European Union following the implementation of the Council Directive on the Term of 
Copyright Protection (93/98/EEC, OJ 1993, L290/9). Currently, post mortem protection in 
most countries lasts for 50 years, following the minimum period laid down in Article 7 of 
the Berne Convention, but the Directive increases protection to 70 years. The principle 
behind this change is not clear, although the need to harmonise terms of copyright 
protection across the European Union was made clear by Case 341/87 EMI Electrola 
GmbH v Patricia Im- und Export [1989] ECR 79. The choice of 70 years is dictated by the 
fact that this is the longest period found in the Member States of the Union, namely in 
Germany; but it is worth noting that this departure from the standard 50-year period 
came about in 1965 only in consequence of the assumed effect of world war upon copyright 
enforcement. It was therefore presumably a measure which was originally intended to be 
of only temporary effect; but now it is to be the law for the whole Union, possibly with 
retrospective effect.  
 Economists have tended to appraise protection in terms of efficiency effects. 
Burrows (1994), for example, considers that this increase is excessive, because it will do 
nothing to increase the amount or the quality of output. However, as he would admit, an 
efficiency criterion is not the only way by which such a change in protection may be 
judged. Clearly the issue of protection is closely related to the view taken about the initial 
property entitlement of the creative artist or composer. Thus for example the extension to 
70 years has been justified on the grounds that the 50-year period was originally intended 
to benefit two generations of the author’s descendants but now that life expectancy is 
greater a longer period is necessary (see MacQueen 1994 for references). An extreme 
version of this entitlement would be to argue that, as with physical property, the 
entitlement exists as long as the asset exists, whoever owns it; and indeed United 
Kingdom law once took this view of unpublished literary works. We can only conclude 
that, whereas the efficiency ‘rule’ could, in principle, be tested by comparing responses to 
differing lengths of protection, the equity ‘rule’ cannot. The most one can expect to achieve 
is a consensus on the principle, but not on its practical manifestation in the form and 
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length of protection. 
 It is further argued that control over performing rights confers monopoly power on 
the owner of the copyright and to extend protection to 70 years is against the interest of 
those who wish to perform the work.  Certainly, the extension of protection may make 
owners of copyright collectively stronger vis-a-vis consumers, but, if copyright protection 
is granted universally to composers, authors etc. then, whether or not the quantity of 
artistic products is affected, competition between members of the same class of 
beneficiaries still takes place. The confusion seems to arise from the definition of 
monopoly used. If I write an original composition and have performing rights in it, I am in 
one sense the ‘sole supplier’ of that product. In that, restricted, sense I am a monopolist. 
However, the relevant point from the consumer’s point of view is whether or not she can 
buy alternatives to my own product and, if that is the case, on what terms. The position is 
unaffected by the conferment of extended post-mortem rights, if these rights are granted 
equally to competitors. There may be unusual cases where a single composition dominates 
the market, but this is likely to be temporary, at least in the music market. The fact that 
performing rights today are normally sold by ‘price cartels’ representing composers is a 
separate issue, but even this market imperfection does not preclude non-price 
competition. (For further analysis see Besen et al 1992.) 
 The practical issue of most importance at this stage is whether the copyright in a 
musical or theatrical work will hold against challenge from producers or consumers. In 
the 19th century, when sheet music was the method of publication, composers might 
detect plagiarism and have recourse to legal action or threaten to take such action. A 
famous case was that of Sir Arthur Sullivan whose opera Mikado contained a song ‘When 
a Merry Maiden Marries’. The first bars of the song bear a close resemblance to the 
refrain of a well-known popular song of the time - ‘Love’s Old Sweet Song’ - and its 
composer Molloy threatened legal action. Sullivan’s defence was that he had never heard 
the song - which seems astonishing in itself - and that, in any case, there were only seven 
notes in the scale! 
 This example also points up the problem as to what constitutes an ‘original’ work. 
In most legal systems within the Berne Union originality is a threshold test which a work 
must pass before copyright in it can be claimed.  In the Anglo-American or Common Law 
legal world, originality has traditionally been taken to mean simply that the form of 
expression of the work in question is not derived from that of any other work but is simply 
the product of the author’s own skill and labour.  However, a work may be derivative yet 
have copyright because the second author has found a different way of expressing the 
same idea or information as the first.  In a saying familiar to copyright lawyers, there is 
no copyright in ideas. In music the cross-over from the inspiration of a predecessor’s ideas 
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to the use of a prohibited form of expression may be particularly difficult to determine. In 
the Civil Law tradition, however, originality has been seen as setting a somewhat higher 
goal of intellectual achievement than mere skill and labour, although there too it the 
ideas/expression dichotomy is firmly established.  Of late there have been signs in the 
Common Law world that the courts are beginning to interpret originality more strictly: 
thus it has been observed that there is much skill and labour in tracing a drawing but 
that would still not be enough to give the tracing copyright (Interlego v Tyco Industries 
[1989] AC 217), while the US Supreme Court has denied copyright to a telephone 
directory on the grounds that while there was clearly ‘sweat of the brow’ in its 
compilation, listing subscribers’ names in alphabetical order together with addresses and 
phone numbers lacked the necessary creative spark for copyright (Feist Publications Inc v 
Rural Telephone Service Company Inc 113 L Ed 2d 358 (1991)).  Equally the Civil Law 
concept of originality is being modified to meet the demand for copyright in works such as 
computer programs and databases. 
 For music, the most difficult issues have arisen in relation to new arrangements of 
existing works and, in the field of popular music, digital sampling and the so-called 
‘hooks’ around which most tunes in the field are based (Frith 1991; Bently 1989).  The 
UK Copyright Act of 1988 poses particular difficulties in this area, because it says that 
the owner of the copyright has the right to stop ‘adaptations’ of his work; and in the 
context of music this is said specifically to include any arrangement or transcription of the 
work.  The extent to which the arranger’s activities are legitimate at all unless licensed 
by the copyright owner is therefore far from clear.  It should be noted, however, that the 
arranger may still have his own copyright in his work.  The same is true even when the 
work that has been arranged is out of copyright. The UK Performing Right Society 
operates a tariff for the performance of such works which is obviously founded on the view 
that the requirement of originality is satisfied; indeed the rates vary according to the 
degree of originality involved (PRS 1991: 45-49). But it is the policy of the PRS and some 
other collecting societies not to give any royalty to the arranger of a  copyright work, 
although it is the practice of some continental organisations to do so (PRS 1991: 44-45). 
 A final point which should be made is to distinguish performing rights from those 
of the performers themselves. Performers’ rights have been gaining international 
recognition since the Rome Convention 1961 and are included in Article 14 of the recent 
TRIPS Agreement. The essence of the performer’s right is however the control of fixation 
of his performance - that is, recording it - rather than over subsequent performances, 
either of the recording (so long as it was duly authorised in the first place), or by other 
performers imitating the style or interpretation of the first performer. In the European 
Union, however, performers’ rights have been extended under the Rental Right Directive 
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of 1992 (92/100/EEC, OJ 1992, L346/61) to include rights to authorise or prohibit 
reproductions, broadcasts, distribution and rental of fixations of performances; a virtually 
copyright-like bundle, the practical implications of which for the recording and 
broadcasting industries are as yet unclear. In addition, while the performer’s rental right 
may be transferred to film or record producers, the performer retains an unwaivable right 
to an equitable remuneration. 
 There are at least two supplementary issues arising from the increasing 
recognition and scope of performers’ rights outlined in the previous paragraph.  First, 
style or interpretation per se seem to lie beyond the scope of both performers’ and 
copyright protection at first sight, since these belong more in the realm of ideas than 
expression; but there is perhaps room for debate, especially in the realm of music 
composed and recorded without a score, where the performance may also be said to be at 
least part of the act of creation. A parallel may perhaps be drawn with English cases 
recognising that a historical writer has a copyright in his interpretation of the event 
usually called the Charge of the Light Brigade, so that the well-known playwright John 
Osborne, who used the book as a source in writing a screenplay for a film about the 
Charge, required the writer’s licence (Harman Pictures NV v Osborne [1967] 1 WLR 723). 
Secondly, in the United States the courts have held that performers may protect 
themselves against imitations of their distinctive vocal styles in what is effectively a tort 
of appropriation of personality (see Midler v Ford Motor Co Inc 849 F 2d 460 (9th Cir, 
1988; Gaines 1993). Particularly in popular music the performer’s style may be much 
more significant to the identification of the work in the public mind than any other 
element. It is not clear to what extent the Midler decision would be applied in the UK. In 
the 1950s the actor Alastair Sim was held unable to prevent the imitation of his 
distinctive tones in an advertisement for baked beans (Sim v H J Heinz & Co Ltd [1959] 1 
WLR 313), but it is now widely thought that this decision was wrong (see MacQueen 
1993: para 1397). Performers’ rights may therefore still develop further in significance, 
and complicate still more the difficulty in establishing who has rights in relation to 
subsequent performances of a work. 
 
III Publication and Promotion 
Mozart, as well as writing his own compositions, played them himself, alone or in 
collaboration with a small orchestra, advertised the concerts at which the compositions 
would be played, and even collected the subscriptions to them. Although his works were 
published, often with considerable revision after first performance, expectation of 
royalties from other performances and from purchase of sheet music, were low. The ‘shelf 
life’ of compositions was so short that by Mozart’s time Bach and Handel’s music could 
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only be heard in Vienna in rare and highly subsidized performances. Conditions were not 
dis-similar in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Britain before the passage of 
the Copyright Act 1911: composers and music publishers still drove hard and complex 
bargains over score publication and concert performances, and in these negotiations 
composers were seldom the winners (see e.g. Rees 1986: 246-51). A post-mortem 
performing right of 70 years would probably have been regarded as a sick joke. 
 The exploitation of performing and neighbouring rights (such as rights in 
recordings and broadcasting relays) is a much more complicated process today and would 
entail negotiation of payments with a wide variety of persons and organizations which 
make the ‘transaction costs’ to the composer, acting on his own account, prohibitive. 
Additionally, particularly in the world of pop music, competition in a market of rapidly 
changing tastes makes returns uncertain, as reflected in the large variations in returns. 
Composers therefore have to find persons with special skills in marketing their work and 
who are also willing to share the risks. Before World War II, it was common for publishers 
of ‘serious’ music to take a long view of the prospects of young composers and to pay them 
regular advances in anticipation of eventual success, relying on cross-subsidization from 
the profits from sales of sheet music and marketing of works for performance in the 
established repertoire. The composer in turn would sign an agreement to offer exclusive 
rights to the publisher for his works and often agreed to perform other tasks for him, such 
as the arrangement and editing of works already in the public domain (see Roth, 1969). 
Gone are the days when a publisher might eventually hit the jackpot through the 
publication of a score - the initial printing of the English vocal score alone of Leon 
Cavallo’s Pagliacci was no less than 5,000 copies, while in 1899 Scott Joplin’s Maple Leaf 
Rag sold a million copies. Today, in the case of serious music, no reliance is placed on the 
sale of the score. Those who achieve performances do so usually because conductors or 
music ensembles have been supplied with a tape recording of the work and income is 
generated through live performances, coupled with records and broadcasts, and the 
orchestral or instrumental parts are hired from the publisher. 
 Something of a throwback to the early days of music performance is to be 
witnessed in the music of pop groups who develop a compositional style and physical 
presentation which, it is hoped, will differentiate their product. The ‘publisher’ is more 
likely to be a recording company, which selects groups on the evidence of talent-spotting 
and demonstration discs, and grooms them for stardom. An agreement will be entered 
into with the group and/or its agent that requires control over their performances, 
recordings and even over the development of their style. As was the case with composers 
in the nineteenth century, recording companies have large numbers of such agreements 
(their ‘artists roster’), most of which will not lead on to commercial success; but those 
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which do will subsidise the provision of opportunities for a much larger number than 
would otherwise be the case (Trebilcock 1976; Monopolies and Mergers Commission 1994: 
7, 92-97). 
 It is not difficult to predict where contractual difficulties will arise in cases of this 
sort. Investment in human capital does not enable the investor to acquire the asset in 
order to put it to some more productive use if the asset does not ‘perform’, including 
selling it on. This is why something like an ‘indenture’ system is favoured by the investor, 
that rights are required over the product of the asset or an agreed period of time, although 
anti-slavery laws should prevent the investor from not allowing the ‘investee’ to buy out 
the contract. The frequent objection to such contracts is that they may be entered into by 
the ‘investee’ without a clear knowledge of their implications. On the other hand, the 
investor, in this case the publisher or record company, will reasonably insist that the risks 
attached to the exploitation of the asset should preclude others from receiving an 
uncovenanted benefit from the investment (see Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
1994 97-100 for the typical contents of such contracts). 
 There have been numerous examples in the British courts of recording artists 
challenging the validity of their contracts with the recording companies, generally with 
some success.  Examples include Fleetwood Mac, Gilbert O’Sullivan, Elton John and 
Holly Johnson (see Schroeder v Macaulay [1974] 1 WLR 1308; Clifford Davis v WEA 
Records [1975] 1 WLR 61; O’Sullivan v Management Agency [1985] QB 428; Elton John v 
Richard Leon James [1991] FSR 357; Garnett 1990).  In the latest case, however, George 
Michael’s challenge to his contract with Sony on the grounds of restraint of trade and 
contravention of Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome was thrown out by Mr Justice Jonathan 
Parker (The Times, 30 June 1994; Michael has now lodged an appeal).  Key factors were 
that the contract in question had replaced an earlier one between the parties; George 
Michael had had expert legal assistance throughout the negotiations; he had affirmed the 
agreement in 1990 even though he was then aware that it might possibly be in restraint 
of trade; and the restraint did not affect trade between member states of the EC.  The 
first three of these factors had not been present in any of the earlier cases, where it was 
clear that the recording companies and managers making the contracts had not always 
ensured that young and inexperienced persons were being well or independently advised; 
on the otther hand, these earlier cases have been convincingly criticised as denying the 
recording companies the capacity to generate income which could then be applied to 
extending the numbers of persons being given the opportunity to record (Trebilcock 1976). 
 
IV ‘Giving Music its Due’ 
As a matter of fact (as opposed to law), even in those countries where copyright operates 
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effectively, the creator of a work to be performed cannot prevent the work being 
performed so that the composer may be able to exercise control over the nature of the 
performance, though some protect ‘le droit moral’ of integrity. The major problem for the 
composer and publisher is to identify when performance is taking place so as to be able to 
collect a royalty. The further problem is to negotiate what that royalty should be. Clearly, 
the opportunity costs to the individual composer and publisher of trying single-handed to 
identify the occasions on which a royalty may be due and to negotiate the amount of 
payment is very high. 
 The problem is sometimes solved in other sectors of the economy by creating the 
condition where those who wish to perform the work are forced into revealing when and 
where performance will take place and how much they are prepared to pay. This is 
possible if circumstances allow the producers of the product or service to merge, so as to 
reduce the range of alternative sources of supply, always subject to anti-monopoly 
legislation. While there are instances in which musical composition is produced by 
combined action, merger virtually renders the composer anonymous. This may be counter 
to the composer’s own aspirations to be separately identified as the creator of a work and 
it may also have the material disadvantage of not differentiating her product as 
distinctive and original. Consequently, composers have confined their collective action, in 
respect of collection of royalties, to setting up of co-operatives designed to exploit their 
individual rights. 
 A full description of the evolution of such co-operatives is beyond the scope of this 
article (for histories of the UK developments, see Peacock and Weir (1975), McFarlane 
(1980) and Ehrlich (1989)). In the United Kingdom, the two major collecting societies 
dealing with performing rights are the Performing Right Society (dealing with the 
copyrights of composers, lyricists and publishers) and Phonographic Performance Ltd 
(dealing with the copyright also enjoyed by the makers of sound recordings). British 
practice may be taken as fairly typical of the activities of such organizations: 
 
 (a) Composers and publishers assign their copyrights to the organisation. This 
transfers ownership and is not a mere licence to the organisation to enforce 
the performing right. At least in the UK there might otherwise be difficulty 
for the organisation in raising court actions in respect of infringing 
performances in its own name (McFarlane 1980: 97-98). 
 (b) The organisation negotiates royalty payments for composers collectively 
and distributes receipts amongst them broadly according to the use made of 
individual composers’ works. 
 (c) It identifies the various classes of user in negotiating royalties, with the 
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result that there are over forty separate tariffs. These cover public 
performance, including pubs (juke boxes), discotheques, cinemas and 
airlines, BBC and independent radio and television broadcasting and 
latterly cable and satellite stations. 
 (d) Typically it grants a blanket licence to a class of user who can then 
‘perform’ any item in the PRS repertoire. 
 (e) It has a policing system (a team of inspectors) to safeguard against 
unlawful use of copyright music. (Punch-ups have been known to take place 
in pubs where inspectors have discovered that tenants do not hold a juke 
box licence.) 
 (f) In order to ensure equitable division of royalties as well as to collect data 
relevant to tariff negotiations, it monitors performance programmes 
extensively. For example, broadcasting stations send complete returns of all 
music used and the PRS monitors broadcasting programmes on a sampling 
basis as a check on the accuracy of returns. Administrative expenses are 
therefore not a negligible item of PRS expenditure (they equalled about 
17.5% of total revenue in 1993 (PRS Yearbook 1994-95: 10, 12)) and will 
vary considerably as between particular classes of user. 
 (g) It acts as a collecting agency for overseas-based composers, with an 
international link-up with similar societies in other countries which collect 
royalties for British-based composers. 
 (h) Typically, it negotiates with groups of users, and not with individuals, and 
some of these groups are powerful and well organised. 
 
 There are large economies of scale attached to the collection of royalties resulting 
in the establishment of a technical monopoly. Even if it is not the intention to exploit this 
power by preventing competition in the collection business, from the policy point of view, 
it is considered undesirable to have a situation where it is not in anyone’s interest to set 
up in competition and where many music-users face a single collecting organization. 
 The ‘monopsony power’ puts the composer and publisher in the position of only 
being able to influence royalty collection through their own membership or through 
representatives on the governing committees.  Only the United States amongst the major 
copyright countries has more than one collecting society in the field of performing rights, 
and even that is the result of a dispute between the original society (ASCAP) and its 
principal clients, the radio stations, in the 1930s (McFarlane 1980: 164-5).  In 1919 a 
substantial group of music publishers withdrew from the UK Performing Right Society in 
order, as they hoped, to  ‘exploit the new craze for dance music by publishing sheet music 
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for the new works ... They believed .. that sales of sheet music would continue to provide a 
sufficient return for the publisher, and that free permission for performance compensated 
for the loss of performing right royalties by the value of the advertisement acquired’ 
(McFarlane 1980: 99).  By 1926 the publishers concerned had re-joined the PRS, the 
development of radio broadcasting in 1922 having shown that the future lay with 
performing rights rather than sheet music.  Some music publishers specialising in 
educational and sacred music managed to resist joining the PRS in the beginning, relying 
on income from sheet sales and concert promotion, and arguing that the purpose of 
publishing music was to ensure performance.  The leading company in the field, Novellos, 
succumbed in 1936, however, recognising that changes in the use of music, particularly in 
films, and the expansion of the international markets to which PRS gave access, had 
made it impossible to earn a commercial return through individual negotiations 
(McFarlane 1980: 145). 
 As one might expect, the interests of composers may differ amongst themselves 
and from those of publishers and collecting agency staff. Indeed it has been argued in 
Germany that there is inconsistency in allowing both composers and publishers to be 
members of the same collecting organisation (Beier et al 1989: 141). A common source of 
disagreement is qualification for full membership of the co-operative which will determine 
the voting strength of those who elect members who act as the equivalent of directors of a 
company. Like any cartelised arrangement, an element of instability is introduced into 
the decision-making process reflecting these differing interests. The PRS has recently 
completed a Corporate Governance review, in the formulation of and response to which 
some of these tensions were again apparent (PRS News, Issue No 41, Autumn 1994, 6-8). 
The fact remains that collecting agencies are comparatively free from major upheavals in 
organisation. Members have only to think of the transaction costs they would inevitably 
have to face if they were to go it alone. 
 It is relations with users that have brought policy issues to the fore. As early as 
1922 the PRS was unsuccessfully challenged in a Scottish court as an illegal combination 
in restraint of trade (PRS v Edinburgh Magistrates 1922 SC 165). This was rejected on 
the grounds that the Society existed to enforce its members’ rights and not to impose 
restrictive conditions on the conduct of their business. The scenario of a monopoly 
confronting large numbers of users in a weak bargaining position is something of a myth. 
Countervailing power developed very early in the evolution of performing right 
enforcement. It arose incidentally in the case of broadcasting companies relaying concerts 
‘live’ or using tapes of musical compositions in copyright. For example, in the UK, by as 
early as 1930 the BBC, then a broadcasting monopoly, provided no less than 35% of the 
revenue of the Performing Right Society, and this percentage has never fallen to less than 
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25% in the ensuing years when revenue from other sources, notably from abroad, has 
risen rapidly. In 1993, the latest year for which figures are available, broadcasting 
accounted for over £50 million or 32% of the PRS revenue for the year (PRS Yearbook 
1994-95: 10, 11, 13). Recognition of the PRS by the infant BBC in 1923 was a major step 
in the Society’s advance; without this, progress would have been much slower and more 
costly. Deliberate use of the countervailing power of users has taken the form of 
co-operation between orchestras, concert agencies and cinema chains in order to 
strengthen their arm in negotiating tariffs. As early as 1919 an organisation called 
initially the British Music Union Ltd and later the International Council of Music Users 
provided organised opposition to PRS tariffs which in 1929-1930 got as far as a 
parliamentary bill - ultimately defeated - designed to fix performing right rates at 
ridiculously low rates (McFarlane 1980: 115-17; Rees 1986: 257-61). 
 The likelihood of major disputes between the PRS and major users following the 
Society’s post-war revision of its tariffs to take account of inflation, along with the 
emergence of Phonographic Performances Ltd as a collecting society in respect of the 
public performance of sound recordings, led to the setting up of the Performing Right 
Tribunal under the Copyright Act 1956 (McFarlane 1980: 131-6, 166-72).  This was an 
official body with the task of resolving disputes when no agreement could be reached 
between the contracting parties. There are parallel institutions in many other countries 
(Freegard 1994). The Performing Right Tribunal played an important role in disputes 
between the PRS and broadcasting companies in 1967 and 1972. But it may be indicative 
of the widespread acceptance of the performing right that there were comparatively few 
other cases before the Tribunal in the 20-plus years of its existence, and most of these 
were rate-fixing exercises in which the Tribunal employed the judicial techniques of 
Solomon in determining figures between one side’s price and the amount the other was 
willing to pay (McFarlane 1980: 177; Cornish 1989: 331). Some cases did deal with issues 
of the societies’ market power, however: so the PRS was not allowed to give discounts to 
users dependent upon membership of particular trade associations, or to charge royalties 
for activities not restricted by copyright, since neither of these protected legitimate 
interests of the society (Cornish 1989: 331-2). The Performing Right Tribunal has become 
the Copyright Tribunal under the 1988 Act, with an extended jurisdiction reflecting the 
growth of collective copyright administration into fields other than performing rights (see 
further below, Part VI). Reported cases from the Tribunal to date suggest that like its 
predecessor its main role is to act as a fixer of rates: in British Amusement Catering 
Trades Association v PPL [1992] RPC 149 in respect of multiple operators of juke-boxes; 
in Working Men’s Club and Institute Union Ltd v PRS [1992] RPC 227 in respect of 
non-profit-making members’ clubs; in British Phonographic Industries v Mechanical 
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Copyright Protection Society [1993] EMLR 86 a royalty rate of 8.25% of the published 
price to dealers was fixed as due from recording companies to composers for the right to 
record a work (see further Frith 1993: 9-11, 17); and in Association of Independent Radio 
Contractors Ltd v PPL [1994] RPC 143 in respect of the independent radio broadcasting of 
records. There has also been a major case not concerned with performing rights, but about 
the royalties to be paid by newspaper publishers for advance weekly TV and radio 
programme schedules - again essentially a matter of fixing a reasonable rate (News Group 
Newspapers Ltd v Independent Television Publications Ltd [1993] RPC 173). 
 In 1988 the Monopolies and Mergers Commission carried out an investigation of 
the licensing policies of the second main collecting society, Phonographic Performances 
Ltd. This was stimulated by another dispute with broadcasting organisations over 
‘needletime’ (the amount of time which could be given to the broadcasting of records as 
opposed to playing live music, usually expressed in hours per day). PPL’s policy was to 
restrict ‘needletime’, in order to encourage the employment of live musicians. This had 
already been recognised as a legitimate interest by the Performing Right Tribunal 
(Cornish 1989: 332). Although the Commission was generally supportive of collecting 
societies, its disapproval of this policy led ultimately to provisions in the Broadcasting Act 
1990 enabling a broadcaster to have unlimited needletime so long as certain conditions 
are met. The new Copyright Tribunal adjudicates on royalty and other disputes arising in 
consequence. 
 The major legal issue between the PRS and users has lain in defining the scope of 
the performing right in law.  Performance was (and is) defined in terms of both live and 
‘canned’ presentations, so that there can be performance in the playing of a sound 
recording or film, or the transmission of a broadcast. The limits remain unclear: it has 
been said that if the statutory definitions were read literally, you might infringe the 
copyright in a concert programme by playing the works listed therein. Only performances 
in public infringe the right. Between the two World Wars the PRS engaged in regular 
litigation on this point, and succeeded in establishing that a wide range of locations were 
‘in public’ for this purpose. There was little problem with theatres and concert halls; but 
there were also cases about hotel lounges, restaurants, members’ clubs, the Womens 
Rural Institute and factories (the last being in respect of the BBC programme ‘Music 
While You Work’, which was played in workplaces throughout the country) (McFarlane 
1980: 103-10, 119-26).  The essence of the matter seems to be the existence of an 
audience other than the performer(s), for whose benefit or pleasure the performance is 
made, and the members of which in some sense are part of the public to whom the work is 
directed. Payment by the audience is unimportant. So in the leading Scottish case the fact 
that the audience consisted of only the members of a club (the Rangers Football Club 
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Supporters Club, Greenock), who did not pay for admission to the performance, did not 
prevent them being part of the audience at which the composer in question had aimed his 
work; accordingly there was performance in public and, in the absence of a licence, 
infringement (PRS v Glasgow Rangers FC Supporters Club, Greenock 1974 SC 49). There 
has been much less PRS-led litigation since 1945, again indicative of the widespread 
acceptance of performing rights; the main cases have concerned the ‘piping’ of music in 
record shops which, it has been established, may be regarded as a public performance 
(PRS v Harlequin Record Shops Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 851). It will be interesting to see 
whether there are any cases in the UK to parallel recent decisions in Germany that 
performances and ‘piped’ music in prisons are not subject to royalties (Re Piped Music in 
Prisons [1993] FSR 575) and in Australia that the playing of music on a telephone ‘hold’ 
system is not a public performance (Australasian PRS Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [1994] RPC 
299). 
 
V Performing Rights in an International Context 
Copyright has an international framework under the Berne Convention of 1886 as several 
times revised (most recently in 1971). This has two main aims: one the establishment of 
certain minimum standards of copyright law in member countries, and the other enabling 
nationals of member countries to receive national treatment in all other member 
countries. Berne now having a very substantial membership, the result of its Article 11 is 
that the performing right which is good in one Berne state is good in much of the rest of 
the world, although it may be noted that different cultures may still offer contrasting 
perspectives on the precise significance of this (see e.g., on the history of copyright in 
Japan, Mitsui 1993). But for the individual composer this simply increases many-fold and 
even further beyond the bounds of practicability the problems of enforcement and the 
conversion of rights into royalties. The problem is overcome by the extension of the scope 
of the collecting society to the international stage. In general each of the copyright 
countries has its own collecting society in respect of the performing right in music, and 
there are close connections between the various national societies which ensure that the 
rights of their members are recognised as universally as possible. Essentially the national 
societies are affiliated under the aegis of the International Confederation of Societies of 
Authors and Composers (CISAM); each grants licences and collects royalties in its own 
country in respect of its own and the repertoires of each affiliated society. There are 
similar establishments in respect of the performance of sound recordings, but these are 
less effective because the international recognition of neighbouring rights is less 
developed through being subject only to the Rome Convention of 1961, which has not been 
as successful as Berne in attracting members and setting detailed standards of protection. 
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But this is being overcome, in particular through the pressure exerted by the conclusion of 
TRIPS under the Uruguay Round of GATT. This commits GATT countries to a strong 
protection of sound recordings in future. 
 Some idea of the importance of foreign revenues to composers can be gleaned from 
the annual reports of the PRS.  In 1993 some £48 million of the Society’s income came 
from overseas, representing about 34% of its total revenue (PRS Yearbook 1994-95: 10, 11, 
15-16). £27.95 million came from Western Europe, £12.8 million from North America and 
£5.16 million from Asia and Australasia (ibid: 15). Going in the other direction, PRS 
allocated £25.5 million to affiliated societies in other countries, by far the largest part 
(nearly £19 million) going to two of the three US collecting societies (ibid: 16). 
 These cross-border arrangements have attracted the attention of the European 
authorities in the context of the push towards a single market. In Case 395/87 Ministere 
Public v Tournier [1989] ECR 2521, the Court of Justice considered the application of 
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome to the agreements between the various national collecting 
societies. The practice of each society was to refuse access to their repertoires by users 
established in other member states.  It was held that the agreements did not in 
themselves infringe Article 85(1), but the systematic refusal of access to foreigners was a 
concerted practice which might affect trade between member states unless it could be 
explained by the need of national societies to set up their own systems of management 
and control in foreign territories if direct access were allowed as proposed. 
 An earlier decision of the European Commission on the rules of the German 
collecting society Gesellschaft fur musikalische Auffuhrungsrechte und mechanische 
Vervielfaltigungsrechte (GEMA) also examined some of the restrictions which supported 
international relationships of the societies in general. One rule which was disapproved 
provided that a collecting society could only have its own nationals as members. Given 
that each collecting society enjoyed a national monopoly, the rule restrained competition 
by denying to members the ability to seek a better deal or express dissatisfaction by 
joining another society (Re GEMA [1971] CMLR D35). There appears now to be no 
requirement in the PRS rules that a member must be a UK national; but in practice 
convenience and, presumably, costs mean that composers and publishers tend still to 
belong to their national organisation and, given the international arrangements which 
have been made, there is no need to join more than one. 
 The ability of the national organisations to charge performing royalties in respect 
of sound recordings has been affected by the Community rules on free movement of goods. 
Under Community law, once a sound recording has been put on the market with the 
consent of the copyright owner anywhere within what is now the Union, the copyright 
owner cannot use copyright to prevent import of that recording into another member 
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state. His right to be first to market is said to be ‘exhausted’. This principle was applied 
against GEMA in a case before the Court of Justice where that organisation sought to 
impose a charge upon imports from the UK equivalent to the difference between the 
statutory royalty of 8% paid to German composers and the 6.25% then standard in Britain 
(Joined Cases 55, 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v GEMA [1981] ECR 147). But 
later the Court upheld a ‘supplementary mechanical reproduction fee’ charged by the 
French organisation SACEM upon imported sound recordings on the basis that it was in 
substance a performing royalty which was unaffected by the free movement of goods 
principle (Case 402/85, Basset v SACEM [1987] ECR 1747). A similar point arose in the 
Tournier case, where the legitimacy of charging performing royalties in respect of 
imported records being played at a French disco was affirmed. 
 
VI Issues raised by the implementation of performing rights 
We conclude by listing and commenting on a number of issues that arise from this 
discussion of the implementation of performing rights: 
 
(i) Consumer welfare 
There is a common presumption that a price cartel, while it does not prevent non-price 
competition, operates against the consumer interest because the consumer is denied a 
choice between outputs provided at a range of prices. Furthermore if the cartel is in effect 
a natural monopoly, given the assignment of rights of composers and writers to a 
collecting society, then competitive forces are not strong enough to influence 
administrative costs. Therefore, it may be held, collecting societies which are natural 
monopolies will be both allocatively and technically inefficient. 
 The first branch of this argument rests on the assumption that the only choice 
open to those paying performing rights is between different suppliers of music who are 
members of the same collecting agency. From the point of view of, say, orchestral 
management, this is correct; but the ‘final buyer’ in the process of musical production is 
the orchestra’s concert audience. They at least can listen to a composer’s work on disc or 
video, on a home record player or VDU, or through radio and TV transmission. At least 
the cartelisation of rights is not exclusive to one collecting agency associated only with live 
performance. The second branch implies that collective agencies, being technical 
monopolies, may operate outside some ‘efficiency frontier’. This suggests reference to 
empirical investigation but, as is clear from the literature (see e.g. Button and 
Weyman-Jones 1994), satisfactory tests run into all sorts of problems. In our case one 
would need to adopt some form of international comparison of administrative costs of 
collecting agencies, but a uniform application of definitions of such costs and 
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standardising for different forms and levels of output present formidable difficulties. 
 The defence of the collecting agencies will be that anyone in a position to contest 
their market is free to do so, that ‘individualised monitoring of performances’ would raise 
the industry average cost curve well above that of any collective agency in a position to 
take advantage of economies of scale, and that any complaints about anti-competitive 
activities may be taken care of by government legislation aimed at removing restrictive 
practices. At the very least, from the consumers’ point of view present methods of 
collection, monitored by a suitable legal regime, is the better of two imperfect alternatives; 
and we are inclined to agree. 
 
(ii)Externalities 
At one time, it was common to argue that ‘serious’ composers conferred ‘uncovenanted 
benefits’ not only on other composers but on the community at large. The arguments are 
well-known. ‘Serious composers’ enhance our international cultural prestige. As musical 
innovators, they develop new musical forms and exploit new sound patterns and new 
instruments such as electronic devices. These innovations ‘filter through’ to the other 
members of the profession and help the development of light and ‘pop’ music. Sixty years 
ago Constant Lambert argued in characteristic fashion: 
 
The sudden post-war efflorescence of jazz was due largely to the adoption of raw 
material of the harmonic richness and orchestral subtlety of the Debussy-Delius 
period of highbrow music ... The harmonic background drawn from the 
impressionistic school opened up a new world of sound to the jazz composer, and 
although the more grotesque orchestral timbres, the brute complaints of the 
saxophone, the vicious spurts from the muted brass, may seem to belie the rich 
sentimentality of their background, they are only thorns protecting a fleshy cactus 
... a sauce piquante  poured over a nice juicy steak. (Lambert 1948: 149-50) 
 
There is something more than token public recognition of the community benefit in the 
allocation of public subsidies to the arts which are devoted to the encouragement of new 
serious music, and the encouragement of new music by the BBC and other public 
broadcasting companies. Although one can appreciate the many complaints by serious 
composers about the inadequacy of such funding and support, it is not relevant to our 
discussion to consider this issue. What is relevant is that ‘pop’ composers claim that they 
are equally innovative and are just as important if not more important elements in 
‘international prestige’, but do not press for government funding other than, perhaps, the 
subsidisation of their musical education. It follows that it is an open question whether or 
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not Constant Lambert’s point is still relevant, given the considerable inter-action between 
‘serious’ and ‘pop’ music. Our impression is that collecting agencies no longer 
‘cross-subsidise’ serious composers to the extent that they used to. 
 
(iii) Extension of collective copyright administration 
The collective administration of performing rights developed very largely in response to 
technological developments which transformed the way in which performances might be 
delivered to the public. Composers were also quick to form a collective response to the 
capacity to reproduce via sound recording; the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society, 
which administers fixation rights, was founded in 1924. A similar story is now occurring 
now with other aspects of copyright, notably the reproduction right. Modern technology 
has facilitated copying in both the commercial and the domestic worlds, whether through 
the medium of the photocopier, the computer or the double-headed audio and video 
recorder. For many copyright owners nowadays the position is rather similar to that of 
composers and publishers of music in the early twentieth century: how, in the face of 
widespread copying, to identify when one’s work is being copied in a way for which a 
royalty should be paid? There have been two aspects to the response: one the 
collectivisation of copyright owners in respect of their rights, the second amendment of 
copyright and other laws in ways which facilitate the collective enforcement of royalties or 
some equivalent. In Britain photocopying was a major issue on which the law was 
uncertain until 1988; while the copying was undoubtedly a prima facie infringement, 
some of it might have been exempted under the fair dealing provisions of the legislation if 
carried out for purposes of private study, research, criticism or review. The 1988 Act 
sought to restrict the use of reprography in educational establishments within very 
narrowly defined limits, but provides that where a relevant licensing scheme was in place 
this restriction no longer applies. This has greatly assisted the work of the Copyright 
Licensing Agency, a collecting society founded in the early 1980s representing authors 
and publishers which grants blanket licences to educational establishments (McFarlane 
1989: 152-53; Flint 1990: 159). Once again disputes about CLA licence terms and royalties 
fall within the jurisdiction of the Copyright Tribunal. 
 Another example of the modification of the law which has facilitated collective 
action by copyright owners is the introduction of rental right. This right currently applies 
to sound recordings, videos and computer programs, and is partly designed to ensure a 
return in respect of home copying of such works as well as what is effectively a private 
performing right. The commercial outlets through which such works are hired to 
consumers are thus required to pay royalties to the producers which are no doubt 
reflected in the prices paid by the consumer; which may therefore in turn be seen as 
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including some sort of indirect royalty to the copyright owner. This gives producers strong 
control over what was a new form of market for their works, and under the Rental Right 
Directive of 1992 (92/100/EEC: OJ 1992, L346/61) it is being extended beyond the 
neighbouring rights to works of authorship and, as noted above (000-0), to performers’ 
rights. Article 4 of the Directive specifically recognises that the unwaivable right of 
equitable remuneration conferred upon authors and performers who transfer their rental 
rights to record or film producers may be entrusted to collecting societies, which in fact 
seems the only sensible way in which these rights may be made effective for their owners. 
Under current UK law, however, the possibility of abuse of power by a collecting society in 
respect of rental is controlled by the ability of the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry to order that rental to the public is to be treated as licensed at a reasonable 
royalty to be determined by the Copyright Tribunal. Rental right may also be linked with 
the ‘public lending right’ established in the UK by legislation in 1979, under which 
authors receive payments from a government-controlled fund in respect of any of their 
books lent to the public by local library authorities. Public lending right is not part of 
copyright, and its administration is in the hands of government rather than a collecting 
society; but with the expansion of rental right beyond the neighbouring right works, this 
may not remain the case. 
 Another development which has not yet taken place in the UK, although it has 
elsewhere in the EU, notably France and Germany, is the levy on blank audio (and 
perhaps video?) tapes. There has been a strong campaign from record producers to 
establish the levy in the UK, but the government, after seeming persuaded, decided 
against its introduction under the 1988 Act. The European Commission appears to favour 
a blank tape levy, which would in effect be a means by which producers could collect a 
royalty in respect of the use of blank tapes to record copyright works. There are immense 
difficulties in the administration of such a scheme, not least in determining which 
producers should collect how much, and how to make allowance for non-infringing uses of 
tapes (Stewart 1989: 422), and these are probably best overcome through a collective 
scheme. It is worth noting however that the High Court of Australia has recently held a 
blank tape levy introduced under the Copyright Amendment Act 1989 to be an 
unconstitutional tax, refusing to recognise it as any form of licence against a background 
where private home taping is not an infringement of copyright (Australian Tape 
Manufacturers Association Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1994) 25 IIC 290). 
 This final point invites the speculation that the development of EC law, coupled 
with the growing importance of the European Court of Justice both as the interpreter of 
that law and arbiter on conformity of national law to the EU Treaties, will promote 
centrifugal tendencies, inducing national collection agencies to form cross-border 
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amalgamations. There have been some developments in this direction in the field of 
mechanical rights (Montgomery 1994). However, the lesson learned from the tremendous 
influence of technology on the implementation of performing rights is that of the 
continuous adaptation of the various interest groups to change if they are to survive 
economically. It is not entirely in the realm of fantasy to envisage that, in the course of 
the next century, technology will allow copyright owners to communicate much more 
directly with those who wish to perform their works and even to see the costs of detecting 
piracy considerably reduced. Composers’ combined action would then be largely confined 
to seeking ways of minimizing the legal costs of enforcement; as usual, lawyers, at least, 
would remain in business! Fortunately for us, exploring this scenario would take us far 
beyond the scope of this contribution. 
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